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TEMPORAL RESOLUTION OF UNCERTAINTY AND RECURSIVE
MODELS OF AMBIGUITY AVERSION
BY TOMASZ STRZALECKI1
Dynamic models of ambiguity aversion are increasingly popular in applied work.
This paper shows that there is a strong interdependence in such models between the
ambiguity attitude and the preference for the timing of the resolution of uncertainty, as
deﬁned by the classic work of Kreps and Porteus (1978). The modeling choices made
in the domain of ambiguity aversion inﬂuence the set of modeling choices available in
the domain of timing attitudes. The main result is that the only model of ambiguity
aversion that exhibits indifference to timing is the maxmin expected utility of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989). This paper examines the structure of the timing nonindiffer-
ence implied by the other commonly used models of ambiguity aversion. This paper
also characterizes the indifference to long-run risk, a notion introduced by Dufﬁe and
Epstein (1992). The interdependence of ambiguity and timing that this paper identiﬁes
is of interest both conceptually and practically—especially for economists using these
models in applications.
KEYWORDS: Ambiguity, preference for early resolution of uncertainty.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
THE CONCEPT OF AMBIGUITYhasbeenstudiedbyeconomistssincetheworkof
Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921). As opposed to risk, where objective proba-
bilities are speciﬁed, ambiguity is characterized by the inability of the decision
maker to formulate a unique probability or by his lack of trust in any single
probability estimate.2 As demonstrated by Ellsberg (1961), people often make
choices that cannot be justiﬁed by a unique probability and are willing to pay a
premium to insure against ambiguity.3
Ambiguity aversion has been a central topic in decision theory in re-
cent years, leading to many elegant formal models. The seminal contribu-
tions of Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), followed by
1This paper is a revised and extended version of Chapters 7 and 8 of my dissertation at North-
western University; some of the results were also reported in my job market paper. Part of this
research was done while I was visiting the Economic Theory Center at Princeton University, to
which I am very grateful for its support and hospitality. I thank Roland Benabou, John Campbell,
Eddie Dekel, Mira Frick, Drew Fudenberg, Paolo Ghirardato, Faruk Gul, Yoram Halevy, Peter
Klibanoff, Fabio Maccheroni, Morgan McClellon, Massimo Marinacci, Stephen Morris, Sujoy
Mukherji, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Ben Polak, Tom Sargent, Todd Sarver, Uzi Segal, and Mar-
ciano Siniscalchi for very helpful discussions and suggestions. I am very grateful to a co-editor
and three anonymous referees for their insightful and helpful comments. All errors are mine.
2In this paper, the word “uncertainty” is an umbrella term for both risk and ambiguity.
3Ellsberg only considered thought experiments, but such behavioral patterns were found in
experimental studies; see Camerer and Weber (1992) and Halevy (2007) and references therein.
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Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006a) and others, captured the idea
that beliefs are not well speciﬁed by using capacities and sets of probability
measures in the representations of preferences. Later contributions focused on
differential attitudes toward risk and ambiguity by using otherwise standard ex-
pected utility representations (e.g., Neilson (1993), Klibanoff, Marinacci, and
Mukerji (2005),a n dErgin and Gul (2009)).
Recent theoretical and applied work involves dynamic models of ambiguity
with a recursive formulation
Vt = u(ct)+βI(Vt+1)  (1)
where uncertainty resolves over time and ambiguity aversion is captured by a
certainty equivalent I that is used in each period to assess uncertain continua-
tion values.4 This formulation nests the standard model of discounted expected
utility as a special case of a linear certainty equivalent E:
Vt = u(ct)+βE(Vt+1)  (2)
In general, in situations where uncertainty does not resolve in one shot,
agents may distinguish between prospects based on the time at which their un-
certainty resolves. However, the standard model of expected discounted utility
(2) is separable across both states and time periods, and, therefore, exhibits
such indifference to timing.5 Recursive models that do exhibit a preference for
temporal resolution were ﬁrst formally studied in the context of risk by Kreps
and Porteus (1978), and subsequently were extended and applied to asset pric-
ing; see, for example, Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991), Weil (1989, 1990), and
Tallarini (2000), among others. Instead of using standard discounting, these
models relax time-separability by using a nonlinear aggregator of the utility of
the present consumption and of the certainty equivalent of the continuation
value
Vt = W

ct E(V t+1)

  (3)
Under the expected utility certainty equivalent, E, the nonlinear aggregator
W captures the attitude toward temporal resolution of uncertainty, which de-
pends on the curvature of W in its second argument.
4Models in this class have recently been applied to questions in ﬁnance and macroeco-
nomics;seeEpsteinandWang(1994),Maenhout(2004),ChenandEpstein(2002),Karantounias,
Hansen,andSargent(2012),KleshchelskiandVincent(2009),JuandMiao(2012),Collard,Muk-
erji, Sheppard, and Tallon (2011), Barillas, Hansen, and Sargent (2009), Li and Tornell (2008),
Chen, Ju, and Miao (2009), Benigno and Nisticò (2009), Ilut (2012),a n dDrechsler (2009).
5In settings where actions can be taken after receiving information, early resolution of uncer-
tainty provides decision value to the agent and even the standard model of expected discounted
utilityexhibitsapreferenceforearlyresolution.ThestandardreferencesincludeBlackwell(1953)
and Spence and Zeckhauser (1972). In contrast, this paper focuses on the intrinsic value of infor-
mation, which arises even in settings with no intermediate decisions.MODELS OF AMBIGUITY AVERSION 1041
In addition to preference for temporal resolution, another feature of pref-
erences present in recursive models is aversion to long-run consumption risk.6
Dufﬁe and Epstein (1992) observed that discounted expected utility is insensi-
tive to the correlation of payoffs across time periods. For example, it is indiffer-
ent between a consumption plan that delivers an independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) sequence of equiprobable payoffs of $0 and $1 and another
plan that delivers either $0 forever or $1 forever, with equal ex ante probabili-
ties. On the other hand, models like (3) typically exhibit sensitivity to long-run
risk: a featurethat underlies much of the recent literature onasset pricing (e.g.,
Bansal and Yaron (2004), Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2008),a n dBansal, Kiku,
and Yaron (2012)).
Departures from expected utility and their relation to temporal attitudes
have been studied in the context of risk (when probabilities are given). Chew
and Epstein (1989) showed that in the class of nonexpected utility preferences,
E is the only certainty equivalent that guarantees indifference to temporal res-
olution. Grant, Kajii, and Polak (2000) strengthened this result by showing that
within a fairly large class of preferences, E is the only certainty equivalent that
guarantees a (weak) preference for early resolution. These results mean that
when probabilities are given, there is not enough ﬂexibility to model separately
the attitudes toward temporal resolution and the attitudes toward uncertainty
other than expected utility. Under objective risk, neutrality toward timing (or
preference for early resolution) cannot be combined with nonexpected util-
ity preferences: any certainty equivalent other than E necessarily produces a
nonuniform attitude to temporal resolution.
1.2. Overview of Results
This paper studies choice under uncertainty, when probabilities are not a
part of the description of alternatives, and formulates the analogues of the no-
tions of preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty and aversion to long-
run risk in this framework. The main ﬁnding is that under uncertainty, pref-
erences are more ﬂexible than under risk and it is possible to model temporal
attitudes separately from the attitudes toward ambiguity, although the class
of models that permit such separation is limited. Theorem 1 shows that the
only model that exhibits indifference to timing is the maxmin expected util-
ity (MEU) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), which strictly includes the
class of expected utility preferences. Moreover, in contrast to the case of ob-
jective risk, Theorems 2 and 4 show that many familiar models of ambiguity
aversion display a preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty. Similarly,
Theorem 6 and Corollary 3 show that all models of ambiguity commonly used
6This paper uses the (now standard) term “long-run risk” in all situations of uncertainty, re-
gardless of whether the probabilities are known.1042 T. STRZALECKI
in applications exhibit long-run risk sensitivity, MEU being again the “knife-
edge” case of indifference.
These results mean that models of ambiguity aversion are more ﬂexible than
models of nonexpected utility under objective risk, as they permit a separation
between the timing and uncertainty attitudes that is not possible in the world of
risk. Such a separation is useful in applications since nonlinear certainty equiv-
alents canbe combined with neutrality towardtiming. The possibility ofmodel-
ing uncertainty attitudes separately from attitudes toward temporal resolution
helps one to understand the implications of departing from the expected utility
assumption on economic variables such as asset prices, returns, and volatility.
Such understanding is not possible in models of objective risk, which entangle
these two attitudes and do not allow for changing them separately.
However, these results also mean that models of ambiguity aversion other
than MEU lead to timing nonindifference and long-run risk sensitivity even
with a linear time aggregator, that is, with standard discounting. Thus, models
of ambiguity aversion generally suffer from problems similar to models of ob-
jective risk. An implication of this ﬁnding is that ambiguity aversion cannot be
varied independently without making implicit assumptions about the tempo-
ral attitudes, preventing the full separation between these two dimensions of
preference.
An extreme case of such lack of separation is the multiplier preferences of
Hansen and Sargent (2001), where there is a one-to-one relationship between
the degree of ambiguity aversion and the temporal attitudes: preferences with
a nonlinear certainty equivalent I have an alternative representation with a
linear certainty equivalent E and a nonlinear aggregator W . Section 5 stud-
ies the general class of reducible preferences where all the nonindifference to
timing embodied in I can be captured, in an alternative representation, by an
appropriately chosen W .T h e o r e m5 characterizes the class of reducible pref-
erences; this class turns out to be rather small and does not exhaust all models
of ambiguity aversion used in applications. Thus emerges a three-way classi-
ﬁcation: (i) discounted MEU preferences (which are indifferent to timing),
(ii) reducible preferences (where I and W are exact “substitutes”), and (iii) ir-
reducible preferences (where I and W are “substitutes,” in light of Theorem 1,
but not exact substitutes).
The interdependence of ambiguity and timing that this paper identiﬁes is
of interest both conceptually and practically, especially for economists using
these models in applications, because it means that the modeling choices that
are being made in the domain of ambiguity attitudes inﬂuence the set of mod-
eling choices that remain available in the domain of timing attitudes. The re-
sults of this paper are qualitative: MEU preferences are indifferent to timing
and all other preferences are not; reducible preferences can be reduced to the
standard case by an appropriate choice of W and irreducible preferences can-
not. A quantitative assessment of the strength of the timing nonindifference
in non-MEU preferences would be helpful to understand the importance ofMODELS OF AMBIGUITY AVERSION 1043
these effects in practice. For example, in any given model of ambiguity, the
calibrated parameters imply a certain ambiguity premium as well as a certain
timing premium.7 In non-MEU models, these two premiums cannot be varied
independently: in reducible preferences, there is a one-to-one relationship be-
tween them; the degree to which they are related in irreducible preferences
depends on the model in question and on the calibrated parameter values.
The interdependence of ambiguity and timing attitudes in non-MEU models
also raises questions about their explanatory power. The preference for earlier
resolution of uncertainty and aversion to long-run risk underlie much of recent
work on asset pricing.8 Given that many applications of ambiguity address the
same phenomena, their implied temporal preference makes it hard to assess
the added explanatory power of ambiguity aversion because it is not possible
to determine whether the predictions of the model about economic variables
of interest are driven by ambiguity aversion or by temporal attitudes. Thus,
caution is needed in attributing these effects and interpreting results of non-
MEU models in applied work.9
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 deﬁnes static ambiguity averse
preferences; Section 3 deﬁnes discounted ambiguity preferences and the no-
tion of preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty; Section 4 studies the
relationship between the attitudes toward ambiguity and timing in models with
a linear time aggregator; Section 5 examines the extent to which a separation
between ambiguity and nonlinear aggregation can be obtained in non-MEU
models; Section 6 studies aversion to long-run risk; ﬁnally, Section 7 compares
these results to the known results for choice under objective risk.
2. STATIC MODELS OF AMBIGUITY ATTITUDES
Let S be the set of states of nature,l e tΣ be an algebra of events,a n dl e tX be
a set of consequences, assumed to be a convex subset of a real vector space. An
act is a Σ-measurable simple function f :S → X; the set of acts is denoted F.
7Epstein, Farhi, and Strzalecki (2013) deﬁned the timing premium in the context of the
Epstein–Zin utility and showed that the value of this premium is high even for reasonable param-
eter values. Computing the magnitude of this premium for models of ambiguity and comparing
it with the premium implied by models of pure risk would be helpful in guiding modeling choices
and directing attention toward models that imply reasonable values. An experimental investiga-
tion of the magnitude of this premium would also be of interest.
8In these models, the preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty and aversion to long-run
risk are linked in a one-to-one fashion to the wedge between risk aversion and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. For this reason, the explanatory power of these models in the context of
asset pricing may be seen as coming either from the differential attitudes or from the preference
for earlier resolution of uncertainty, and is largely a matter of interpretation.
9This paper does not settle this issue, but it does outline the basic modeling trade-off by clas-
sifying the dynamic ambiguity models into the aforementioned categories. As mentioned above,
the exact degree of interdependence depends on the parameter calibrations used; the quantiﬁca-
tion of its magnitude is left for future work.1044 T. STRZALECKI
Let B0(Σ) denote the set of all real-valued Σ-measurable simple functions and
let B0(Σ K) be the set of all such functions that take values in some set K ⊆ R.
Let Δ(Σ) be the set of all ﬁnitely additive probability measures on (S Σ).
Static preferences studied in this paper are represented by
V( f)= I(u◦f)  (4)
where u:X → R is an afﬁne utility function and I :B0(Σ u(X)) → R is the
certainty equivalent that represents the decision maker’s “beliefs” by aggre-
gating the utility values over states. It will be maintained throughout that u is
unbounded; more speciﬁcally, that u(X) = R or u(X) = R+.
The most basic example of such a functional is that associated with the fa-
miliar subjective expected utility (SEU) preferences, where for some probabil-
ity measure p ∈ Δ(Σ) the functional is of the form I(ξ) =

ξdp for each
ξ ∈ B0(Σ u(X)). Another well known example is the functional associated
with Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) maxmin expected utility (MEU) prefer-
ences, where I(ξ)= minp∈C

ξdp for some convex and weak∗-closed set of
measures C ⊆ Δ(Σ).10 Other important models include the following:
• Second-order expected utility preferences (Ergin and Gul (2009), Nau
(2006), Neilson (1993)), where I(ξ) = φ−1(

φ(ξ)dp) for some strictly in-
creasing and concave function φ : u(X) → R.
• Smooth ambiguity preferences (Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji
(2005), Seo (2009);s e ea l s oSegal (1987)), where
I(ξ)= φ
−1

Δ(Σ)
φ

ξdp

dμ(p)

for some strictly increasing and concave function φ:u(X) → R and a Borel
probability measure μ on Δ(Σ).
• Variational preferences (Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini
(2006a)), where I(ξ)= minp∈Δ(Σ)

ξdp + c(p) for a convex and weak∗-lower
semicontinuous function c:Δ(Σ) →[ 0 ∞].
• Multiplier preferences (Hansen and Sargent (2001), Strzalecki (2011))w i t h
I(ξ)= minp∈Δ(Σ)

ξdp + θR(p   q),w h e r eR(p   q) is the relative entropy
of p with respect to some ﬁxed countably additive and nonatomic measure
q ∈ Δ(Σ),a n dθ ∈ (0 ∞] is a parameter.
• Conﬁdence preferences (Chateauneuf and Faro (2009)), deﬁned for
u(X) = R+, where for some quasiconcave and weak∗-upper semi-
continuous function ϕ:Δ(Σ) →[ 0 1] and a parameter α ∈ (0 1), I(ξ) =
min{p∈Δ(Σ)|ϕ(p)≥α}
1
ϕ(p)

ξdp.11
10An important subclass of MEU are Choquet expected utility preferences (Schmeidler (1989)),
where I(ξ)=

ξdυ for some convex capacity υ:Σ →[ 0 1].
11An extension of these preferences to the case of u(X) = R was studied by Cerreia-Vioglio,
Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2011, Theorem 21).MODELS OF AMBIGUITY AVERSION 1045
All of these examples feature a functional I that is continuous (in the sup-
norm topology), monotonic (i.e., I(ξ) ≥ I(ζ) whenever ξ(s) ≥ ζ(s) for all
s ∈ S), normalized (I(k)= k for all k ∈ u(X), interpreted as constant func-
tions), and quasiconcave (I(αξ+(1−α)ζ) ≥ min{I(ξ) I(ζ)}). The last prop-
erty corresponds to the famous uncertainty (or ambiguity) aversion axiom of
Schmeidler (1989), which postulates that the decision maker does not like vari-
ability of payoff across states.
Preferences that can be represented by a belief functional I with these four
properties are called uncertainty averse preferences.12 This representation of
preferences makes it convenient to study attitudes toward ambiguity. A deci-
sion maker has constant absolute ambiguity aversion13 if I(ξ+ k) = I(ξ)+ k
for all k ∈ u(X) and ξ ξ + k ∈ B0(Σ u(X)). The subclass of uncertainty
averse preferences with this property is precisely the class of variational pref-
erences. Similarly, a decision maker has constant relative ambiguity aversion if
I(bξ)= bI(ξ) for all b>0a n dξ ∈ B0(Σ u(X)).W h e nu(X) = R+, the sub-
class of uncertainty averse preferences with this property is the class of conﬁ-
dence preferences.14 All of the above utility representations have been behav-
iorally characterized by axioms imposed on the preference relation. The results
obtained in this paper are stated directly in the language of these representa-
tions; however, all the results can be expressed in the language of preferences,
a task that will not be undertaken here.
3. DYNAMICS
The purpose of this section is to deﬁne formally what it means for the de-
cision maker to care about the timing of uncertainty. To do so, a model will
be studied where uncertainty is dated by the time of its resolution: in each
period, there is a state space S, and the payoff at time t may depend on the
realization of the period t uncertainty and/or uncertainty that has already re-
solved in previous periods. This choice domain is an analogue of Kreps and
Porteus’s (1978) framework of temporal lotteries, with the difference that here
uncertainty is subjective and preferences may not be expected utility.15 This re-
12In a recent paper, Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011) showed that I is represented by I(ξ) =
minp∈Δ(Σ)G(

ξdp p) for some quasiconvex function G:R × Δ(Σ) → R that is increasing in
its ﬁrst argument. The results in this paper do not rely on this (very interesting) representation.
13See Proposition 3 of Grant and Polak (2013) and also Deﬁnition 6 of Klibanoff, Marinacci,
and Mukerji (2005).
14As the intersection of both classes, MEU preferences are characterized by both properties.
15Epstein and Zin (1989), Chew and Epstein (1989), Segal (1990),a n dGrant, Kajii, and Polak
(1998, 2000) studied nonexpected utility preferences in the objective risk framework. Section 7
compares those ﬁndings to the results obtained here. The domain of consumption plans that is
studied in this paper has been used for axiomatization purposes by Sarin and Wakker (2000),
Epstein and Schneider (2003a, 2003b), and Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006b),
among others.1046 T. STRZALECKI
cursive framework is also used in ﬁnance and macroeconomics, where in each
period, S is the set of possible “shocks.”
Formally, time is discrete, t = 0 1     T with T ﬁnite. The set of states of
the world is Ω = ST. Information arrival is modeled as the naturally deﬁned
ﬁltration {Gt}t∈T,w h e r eG0 ={ ∅  Ω},a n df o rt = 1     T, Gt = Σt ⊗{ ∅  S}T−t
is the product sigma algebra of t copies of Σ and T − t copies of the triv-
ial sigma algebra. Thus, at time t, the decision maker knows the realiza-
tions of uncertainty up to time t, but is ignorant about the future. For any
ω = (s1     s T),l e tωt = (s1     s t) be the history of observations up to time t.
The consumption plans are modeled as ﬁnite-ranged X-valued adapted pro-
cesses h = (h0 h 1     h T),w h e r eht :Ω → X is Gt-measurable for each t ≤ T.
Let H denote the set of all consumption plans. The family of relations {t ω}
on H describes the agent’s conditional preferences.
3.1. Attitudes Toward Timing of Resolution of Uncertainty
This section deﬁnes formally the notion of preference for earlier resolution of
uncertainty in the domain of subjective uncertainty. The proposed deﬁnition is
based on the deﬁnition of Kreps and Porteus (1978) established in the domain
of objective risk (cf. their Theorem 3 and Axiom 5.1). The main idea is to
consider a single bet f on S that pays off at time t +2. The question is whether
at time t the agent prefers to learn about the outcome of f in period t + 1o r
in period t +2.
Formally, let f :S → X and deﬁne a Gt-measurable act ˇ ft :Ω → X by
ˇ ft(s1     s T) = f(s t).T h ea c t ˇ ft is a “copy” of the bet f that resolves at time t,
that is, that depends only on the tth component of the state space. Intuitively,
given any f ∈ F, the act ˇ ft is equally uncertain as ˇ ft+1, but resolves earlier.
Fix a node (t ω) and a consumption plan h. Suppose that the only uncer-
tainty that the decision maker faces is about the period t + 2 payoff, that is,
only ht+2 is a nondegenerate act. Consider two scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario,
the uncertainty resolves early, that is, the decision maker learns the realiza-
tions of ht+2 already in period t + 1. Formally, let ht+2 = ˇ ft+1 for some f ∈ F.
In the second scenario, the uncertainty resolves late, that is, the decision maker
learns the realizations of ht+2 only in period t + 2. Formally, let ht+2 = ˇ ft+2 for
the same f ∈F as above.
The following deﬁnition introduces a binary relation t on consumption
plans that ensures that both plans have no uncertainty other than in period
t +2 and that uncertainty resolves earlier for the ﬁrst plan.
DEFINITION 1: For any h h  ∈ H and t ≤ T −2, denote h t h  if and only if
there exists f ∈ F and x0     x t+1 x t+3     x T ∈ X such that hj = h 
j = xj for
all j  = t +2, ht+2 = ˇ ft+1,a n dh 
t+2 = ˇ ft+2.MODELS OF AMBIGUITY AVERSION 1047
FIGURE 1.—Uncertainty resolves early.
For example, the consumption plan depicted in Figure 1 dominates the con-
sumption plan from Figure 2 according to the relation 0. A decision maker
whose preferences always respect this order is said to display a preference for
earlier resolution of uncertainty.
DEFINITION 2: The family of relations {t ω} exhibits a preference for earlier
resolution of uncertainty if and only if for all h h  ∈ H and t ≤ T −2,
h t h
  implies h t  ω h
 
for all t  ≤ t and ω ∈ Ω. The notions of indifference to timing of resolution of
uncertainty and strict preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty are deﬁned
analogously.
3.2. Dynamic Models
3.2.1. Discounted Uncertainty Averse Preferences
DEFINITION 3 —Discounted Uncertainty Averse Preferences: A family
{t ω}hasadiscounteduncertaintyaverserepresentationwithparameters(β I u)
FIGURE 2.—Uncertainty resolves late.1048 T. STRZALECKI
if it is represented by a family of functionals Vt :Ω×H → R deﬁned recursively
by VT(ω h) = u(hT(ω)),a n df o rt<T,
Vt(ω h) = u

ht(ω)

+βI

Vt+1(· h)

  (5)
where u:X → R is afﬁne, β ∈ (0 1),a n dI :B0(Σ u(X)) → R is normalized,
monotone, continuous, and quasiconcave.16
Note that Vt+1(· h) is Gt+1-measurable for each h ∈ H; for this reason, in
period t, Vt+1(· h) deﬁnes an element of B0(Σ u(X)), which represents the
uncertainty about the period t + 1 continuation value that the decision maker
faces at period t, knowing the history of realizations ωt.
Discounted uncertainty averse preferences include as special cases most of
the models used in applications,17 but, in general, they allow for more ﬂexible
models of ambiguity aversion, as described in Section 2.
An issue that is often discussed in the context of ambiguity averse prefer-
ences is that, in general, they violate the regularity properties possessed by the
standard model of expected discounted utility: dynamic consistency and conse-
quentialism.18 The methods of updating preferences that resolve the trade-off
between these two properties include the dynamically consistent but not con-
sequentialist updating rules investigated by Hanany and Klibanoff (2007, 2009)
and the model of consequentialist but dynamically inconsistent preferences
studied by Siniscalchi (2011).
This paper follows a third approach, that of Sarin and Wakker (1998) and
Epstein and Schneider (2003b), by restricting the class of events on which up-
dating takes place: the ﬁltration {Gt}t∈T on the space Ω is ﬁxed throughout and
the only events on which the agent updates belong to {Gt}t∈T .T h i sd o m a i nr e -
striction makes room for preferences that are at the same time dynamically
consistent and satisfy consequentialism.19
3.2.2. IID Ambiguity
The effects identiﬁed in this paper are also present in a formulation more
general than (5), which allows for different certainty equivalents in every pe-
riod:
Vt(ω h) = u

ht(ω)

+βIt

ω
t V t+1(· h)

  (6)
16The results of this paper hold also under the often used alternate speciﬁcation of the recur-
sion Vt(ω h) = u(ht(ω))+I(βVt+1(· h)).
17For example, the recursive maxmin expected utility preferences of Epstein and Schnei-
der (2003b), the recursive smooth ambiguity preferences of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji
(2009), and the time consistent dynamic variational preferences of Maccheroni, Marinacci, and
Rustichini (2006b).
18For deﬁnitions of these terms in the context of risk, see Machina (1989).
19This approach is independent of how the updating rule resolves the trade-off between dy-
namic consistency and consequentialism on events outside of the event tree determined by the
ﬁltration.MODELS OF AMBIGUITY AVERSION 1049
However, in this more general model, the attitudes toward timing are con-
founded with changing beliefs. To see that, observe that given any f :S → X,
the difference between the acts ˇ ft and ˇ ft+1 is twofold. First, these two acts dif-
fer in the timing of their resolution. Second, they differ in the extent to which
the beliefs about the tth copy of S differ from the beliefs about the t +1th copy
of S. In the formulation (6), a preference for ˇ ft over ˇ ft+1 is a result of the intrin-
sic preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty plus the effect of changing
beliefs.20 By imposing a “constant beliefs” assumption, known as IID (Inde-
pendently and Indistinguishably Distributed) ambiguity,21 the formulation (5)
eliminates this latter effect and isolates the pure attitudes toward timing.
It is worth pointing out that the IID assumption amounts to an assumption
on the underlying uncertainty of the environment and not on the consump-
tion process. The consumption process may or may not involve correlation;
compare Figures 3 and 4 (which is the reason why the preferences distinguish
between them). In fact, just as in the probabilistic environment, a sequence of
i.i.d. randomvariables can beused to construct (almost) any stochastic process:
here almost any dependence structure of current on past consumption can be
represented. The IID assumption on the state space is needed only to ensure
that the notion of early resolution of uncertainty is well deﬁned.
4. DISCOUNTED PREFERENCES AND TIMING OF RESOLUTION
This section takes as given a family of discounted uncertainty averse prefer-
ences {t ω}, deﬁned by expression (5), and examines the relationship between
the attitudes toward ambiguity, as described in Section 2, and the attitudes to-
ward timing of resolution of uncertainty, as described in Section 3.1.T h em a i n
message is that the modeling choices in the domain of ambiguity have strong
consequences for the resulting attitudes toward timing. The starkest manifes-
tation of this interdependence is Theorem 1, which says that the only way to
ensure indifference to timing is by using the maxmin expected utility model.
20This issue does not arise in the model of Kreps and Porteus (1978) because of the objective
nature of the probabilities in their formulation. The only difference between the analogues of ˇ ft
and ˇ ft+1 is the timing of their resolution because their probabilities are objectively the same.
21The notion of IID ambiguity was introduced by Chen and Epstein (2002) and Epstein and
Schneider (2003a) in the context of the MEU model; it means that the uncertainty that the deci-
sion maker faces in period t is identical to the uncertainty in period t +1, the only distinguishing
property being the timing of their resolution. Intuitively, a decision maker has IID ambiguity if
in each period, he faces a new Ellsberg urn; because he observes only one draw from each urn,
he cannot make inferences across urns and will not learn his way out of ambiguity, as opposed to
observing repeated sampling (with replacement) from the same urn. (The failure of inference in
such settings is known in econometrics as the problem of incidental parameters (see, e.g., Neyman
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THEOREM 1: A family of discounted uncertainty averse preferences {t ω} sat-
isﬁes indifference toward timing of resolution of uncertainty if and only if I is a
MEU functional.
The intuitive reason why MEU preferences satisfy indifference to timing is
that the worst-case scenario belief is the same irrespective of how far in the
future a given act pays off (in other words, the MEU functional has constant
relative ambiguity aversion). Similarly, since the MEU functional has constant
absolute ambiguity aversion, the preference comparison in Deﬁnition 2 is not
affected by intermediate payoffs. The proof of Theorem 1 shows that these two
propertiescharacterizeindifference towardtiming; sincethey alsocharacterize
MEU, the result follows.
Theorem 1 implies that assuming any other model of ambiguity aversion re-
sults in a family of preferences that exhibits nonindifference to timing. The
subsequent theorems in this section examine the structure of the nonindiffer-
ence implied by models of ambiguity other than MEU. An important, although
straightforward, observation is that preference for early resolution is guaran-
teed by the concavity of I.
THEOREM 2: If {t ω} is a family of discounted uncertainty averse preferences
represented by a concave functional I, then {t ω} satisﬁes preference for earlier
resolution of uncertainty.
This result implies, in particular, that, as a consequence of their concavity,
the variational preferences display a preference for earlier resolution of un-
certainty (the only knife-edge case of indifference being the subclass of MEU
preferences).
COROLLARY 1: If {t ω} is a family of discounted uncertainty averse prefer-
ences where I is variational, then {t ω} satisﬁes preference for earlier resolution
of uncertainty.
Thenextresultshowsthatwhentheutilityfunctionisunboundedfromabove
and from below (i.e., u(X) = R), the variational preferences are the only class
of preferences with a concave I.
THEOREM 3: Suppose I :B0(Σ) → R is concave, monotonic, continuous, and
normalized. Then I represents a variational preference.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: concavity and normalization
of I imply that I(ξ+ k) ≥ I(ξ)+ k ∈ R for all k. Since the domain of I is
unrestricted, the inequality also has to hold with the reverse sign, implying
constant absolute ambiguity aversion, which is the desired conclusion (cf. the
deﬁnition in Section 2). With a bounded utility, this last step does not have to
hold, making room for nonvariational preferences in the class of preferences
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Theorem 3 points to a modeling restriction that may be of importance in
applied work: if a researcher commits to a concave certainty equivalent and an
unbounded utility, such as u(x) = logx, then she cannot use any other model
than variational preferences.
However, when u(X) = R+, other classes of preferences also admit a con-
cave representation—for example the constant relative ambiguity aversion
preferences. Thus, by Theorem 2,i fu(X) = R+, these preferences exhibit a
preference for early resolution. By contrast, when u(X) = R, they typically
result in nonuniform attitudes toward timing; the only subclass with uniform
attitudes is maxmin expected utility preferences.
COROLLARY2: Supposethat {t ω} isafamilyofdiscounteduncertaintyaverse
preferences and I satisﬁes constant relative ambiguity aversion.
(i) If u(X) = R+, then {t ω} satisﬁes preference for earlier resolution of un-
certainty.
(ii) If u(X) = R and if {t ω} displays a preference for earlier resolution of
uncertainty, then I is MEU.
The results so far show that preferences with concave I, such as the vari-
ational and the conﬁdence preferences, always exhibit a preference for ear-
lier resolution of uncertainty, while preferences with nonconcave I,s u c ha s
the constant relative ambiguity aversion preferences with u(X) = R,a l w a y s
display a nonuniform attitude toward timing of uncertainty. The next two im-
portant classes of preferences are nonconcave, but depending on the under-
lying function φ, they can either display a preference for earlier resolution of
uncertainty or exhibit nonuniform attitudes toward timing. The following two
conditions will be used in classifying these cases.
CONDITION 1: There exists A ≥ 0 such that −
φ  (a)
φ (a) ∈[ βA A] for all a ∈ R.
CONDITION 2: β[−
φ  (βa+k)
φ (βa+k)]≤[ −
φ  (a)
φ (a)] for all a k ∈ R+.
Both conditions require that the curvature of the function φ (the Arrow–
Pratt coefﬁcient) does not vary too much.22 Condition 1 is stronger than Con-
dition 2. They both permit constant absolute ambiguity aversion23; additionally
22Since the second-order expected utility preferences are reducible (using the terminology of
Section 5), the conditions on φ can be seen as being equivalent to the conditions on the convexity
of the aggregator W from Example 1, required by the Kreps–Porteus criterion for preference for
earlier resolution of uncertainty. A similar reasoning obtains for the smooth ambiguity prefer-
ences.
23Constant absolute ambiguity aversion corresponds to the intersection of SOEU with the class
of variational preferences, which is precisely the class of the multiplier preferences; see Strzalecki
(2011). The fact that those preferences satisfy a preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty
follows already from Corollary 1.1052 T. STRZALECKI
Condition 2 permits constant relative ambiguity aversion, that is, φ(a)= aγ for
some γ ∈ (0 1).24
Theorem 4 identiﬁes a subclass of second-order expected utility (SOEU)
preferences and smooth ambiguity preferences that displays a preference for
earlier resolution of uncertainty.
THEOREM 4: Suppose that {t ω} is a family of discounted uncertainty averse
preferences where I is second-order expected utility or smooth ambiguity with a
twice differentiable function φ.
(i) If u(X) = R and if Condition 1 holds, then {t ω} displays a preference for
earlier resolution of uncertainty.
(ii) If u(X) = R+ and if Condition 2 holds, {t ω} displays a preference for
earlier resolution of uncertainty.
REMARK 1: The converse to Theorem 4 holds if I is second-order expected
utility. When I is smooth ambiguity, the converse holds under an additional
assumption. Theorems 7 and 8 in Appendix A establish these results.
REMARK 2: Note that Theorem 4 together with Theorem 3 imply that the
converse to Theorem 2 does not hold. Speciﬁcally, suppose that u(X) = R
and {t ω} is a family of discounted uncertainty averse preferences where I is
second-order expected utility or smooth ambiguity with φ that satisﬁes Condi-
tion 1 but is not negative exponential. Theorem 4 implies that {t ω} displays a
preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty. However, {t ω} is not convex.
To see that, suppose that it is; then, by Theorem 3, I is variational which (in
light of Theorem 1 of Strzalecki (2011) and Corollary 22 of Cerreia-Vioglio et
al. (2011) implies that φ is negative exponential, a contradiction.
5. NONLINEAR AGGREGATORS AND REDUCIBLE CERTAINTY EQUIVALENTS
TheresultssofardemonstratethatMEUistheonlycertaintyequivalentthat
admits a separation between ambiguity aversion and temporal resolution of
uncertainty. MEU is a benchmark of timing indifference since in a model with
discounting, the MEU certainty equivalent exhibits timing indifference, while
all other certainty equivalents result in timing nonindifference. Since nonneu-
tral timing attitudes can also be obtained by using a nonlinear time aggregator
W , a natural question is which of the non-MEU certainty equivalents have an
alternate representation with a nonlinear W ? A certainty equivalent I is re-
ducible if the discounted uncertainty averse preferences represented by I have
an alternative representation with a MEU certainty equivalent and a nonlin-
ear aggregator W . In other words, I is reducible if all of the timing attitudes
24Constant relative ambiguity aversion corresponds to the intersection of SOEU with the class
of conﬁdence preferences. The fact that those preferences satisfy a preference for earlier resolu-
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implicit in I can be explicitly rewritten using W . This section obtains a charac-
terization of reducible certainty equivalents.
First, a more general class of preferences is deﬁned by relaxing the standard
discounting assumption in expression (5).
DEFINITION 4—Recursive Uncertainty Averse Preferences: A family {t ω}
has a recursive uncertainty averse representation with (W I v) if it is represented
by a family of functionals Vt :Ω × H → R deﬁned recursively by VT(ω h) =
v(hT(ω)) and for t<T,
Vt(ω h) = W

ht(ω) I

Vt+1(· h)

  (7)
where v:X → R, the aggregator W :X ×R → R is continuous, strictly increas-
ing, and unbounded in the second argument, and I :B0(Σ) → R is normalized,
monotone, continuous, and quasiconcave.
ThesepreferencesareanaturalgeneralizationofthosestudiedinKoopmans
(1960), Kreps and Porteus (1978),a n dEpstein and Zin (1989) to subjective
uncertainty.25 The discounted preferences deﬁned by (5) correspond to the
special case of recursive preferences deﬁned by (7)w i t hW disc(x γ) = u(x) +
βγ for some afﬁnefunction u:X → R.T h em o d e lo fKrepsand Porteus (1978)
has IEU(ξ) =

ξdp. In this model, the standard discounting aggregator W disc
implicit in expression (5) characterizes indifference to timing of resolution of
uncertainty, while nonlinear aggregators lead to nonindifference (in particular,
convexity of W in the second argument corresponds to the case of preference
for earlier resolution).
DEFINITION 5—Reducible Certainty Equivalent: A certainty equivalent
I :B0(Σ) → R is reducible if and only if a family of discounted uncertainty
averse preferences {t ω} with representation (W disc I u)has a recursive un-
certainty averse representation with (W IMEU v) for some MEU certainty
equivalent IMEU.
EXAMPLE 1: Consider the second-order expected utility certainty equiv-
alent: ISOEU(ξ) = φ−1(

φ(ξ(s))dq(s)) and W disc(x γ) = u(x) + βγ.T h e o -
rem 1 implies that such preferences exhibit timing nonindifference; note that
this nonindifference may be attributed to the fact that the certainty equiv-
alent does not belong to the MEU class. However, these preferences can
be rewritten as Kreps–Porteus preferences with IEU(ξ) =

ξ(s)dq(s) and
W( x  d)= φ(u(x)+ βφ−1(d)) for all x ∈ X and all d ∈ Range(φ). From this
25Other subjective extensions have been studied and axiomatized by Hayashi (2005), Klibanoff
and Ozdenoren (2007),a n dSkiadas (1998). Skiadas (1998) also studied attitudes toward timing
by assuming that preferences are deﬁned over pairs consisting of a consumption plan and exoge-
nously given information in the form of a ﬁltration to which the consumption plan is adapted. For
a continuous time extension, see Lazrak (2004).1054 T. STRZALECKI
point of view, the timing nonindifference may be attributed entirely to the non-
linear aggregator, since the certainty equivalent is (a special case of) MEU.
Example 1 shows that second-order expected utility is reducible.26 In gen-
eral, reducible certainty equivalents result in preferences where I and W are
substitutes: timing nonindifference can be attributed either to the curvature of
I (I being outside of the MEU class) or the curvature of W (W being outside
of the discounting class). The next theorem characterizes the class of reducible
certainty equivalents.
DEFINITION 6: The functional I is a second-order maxmin expected util-
ity (SOMEU) if and only if there exists a strictly increasing and concave
function φ:R → R and a convex and weak∗-closed set C ⊆ Δ(Σ) such that
I(ξ)= minp∈C φ−1(

φ(ξ)dp).
THEOREM 5: A certainty equivalent I is reducible if and only if I is SOMEU.
The class of reducible certainty equivalents characterized by Theorem 5 has
two parameters: a set of priors C and a curving function φ. This class general-
izes both the MEU preferences (with φ being an afﬁne function) and second-
order expected utility preferences (with C being a singleton). For such pref-
erences, the timing nonindifference induced by the non-MEU nature of the
certainty equivalent can be exactly offset by an appropriate choice of the ag-
gregator. The exact form of the aggregator is given in the following remark.
REMARK 3: If I is reducible, then the recursive representation (W IMEU v)
has v(x) = φ(u(x)) for all x ∈ X, IMEU(ξ) = minp∈C

ξdp for all ξ ∈ B0(Σ),
and either (a) W( x  d)= φ(u(x) + βφ−1(d)) for all x ∈ X and all d ∈
Range(φ) or (b) there exist a>0, e c b ∈ R such that W( x  d)= aφ(u(x) +
βφ−1(d)) + b for all x ∈ X,a l ld ∈ Range(φ),a n dφ(r) = ear/c +
b
1−a for all
r ∈ R.
6. AVERSION TO LONG-RUN RISK
This section studies another behavioral property of preferences: the attitude
toward long-run risk. The proposed deﬁnition adapts the notions formally in-
troduced by Dufﬁe and Epstein (1992) to the domain of subjective uncertainty.
Consider the following two consumption plans. In the ﬁrst one, a coin is
tossed every period and the payoff in each period depends on that period’s
coin toss, say $1 if heads and $0 if tails. This scenario will be referred to as i.i.d.
risk or short-run risk. In the second consumption plan, the coin is tossed only
once, at the beginning of time, and then either $1 or $0 is paid forever. This
scenario will be referred to as long-run risk. See Figures 3 and 4.MODELS OF AMBIGUITY AVERSION 1055
FIGURE 3.—IID risk.
In general, a decision maker may well have different sensitivities to short
and long-run shocks; however, an expected discounted utility model forces in-
difference as a consequence of the separability of the criterion across states
and time periods.
As in Section 3.1,f o ra n yf : S → X,d e ﬁ n eaGt-measurable act ˇ ft :Ω → X
by ˇ ft(s1     s T) = f(s t); that is, the act ˇ ft is a copy of the act f that resolves
at time t (i.e., that depends only on the tth component of the state space).
The short-run risk (or i.i.d. risk) consumption plan associated with act f is
h
SR
f = ( ˇ f0  ˇ f1      ˇ fT). The long-run risk consumption plan associated with act
f is hLR
f = ( ˇ f0  ˇ f0      ˇ f0).
DEFINITION 7: The family of relations {t ω}(t ω)∈T ×Ω exhibits aversion to
long-run risk if and only if for all f ∈ F, the preference h
SR
f 0 hLR
f holds. The
notions of indifference to long-run risk and strict aversion to long-run risk are
deﬁned analogously.
FIGURE 4.—Long-run risk.
26In particular, the multiplier preferences of Hansen and Sargent (2001) belong to this class by
taking φ to be negatively exponential.1056 T. STRZALECKI
The following results establish the relationship between the attitudes toward
ambiguity, as described in Section 2, and the attitudes toward long-run risk, as
described in Deﬁnition 7. Similarly to the case of timing of resolution, the main
message is that the modeling choices in the domain of ambiguity have strong
consequences for the resulting attitudes toward long-run risk. The following
theorem shows that in the class of preferences with concave representation, all
preferences but MEU display a strict aversion to long-run risk.
THEOREM 6: Suppose that {t ω} is a family of discounted uncertainty averse
preferences where I is concave and strictly monotone, that is, I(ξ+ k) > I(ξ)
for all ξ and k>0. Then {t ω} satisﬁes aversion to long-run risk. Moreover, it
displays indifference if and only if I is a MEU functional.
The following corollary shows that Theorem 6 covers all utility speciﬁcations
commonly used in applications.
COROLLARY 3:
(i) Any family {t ω} of dynamic variational preferences displays aversion to
long-run risk with indifference if and only if {t ω} is MEU.
(ii) Any family {t ω} of conﬁdence preferences with u(X) = R+ displays aver-
sion to long-run risk with indifference if and only if {t ω} is MEU.
(iii) Any family {t ω} of smooth ambiguity or second-order expected utility
preferences with concave φ that is constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) or
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) displays aversion to long-run risk with in-
difference if and only if {t ω} is expected utility (EU).
REMARK 4: It is worth noticing that long-run risk involves early resolution
of uncertainty, since all future payoffs will be known in period 1. However,
although both variational and conﬁdence preferences exhibit a preference for
earlier resolution of uncertainty, they exhibit aversion to long-run risk because
the aversion to correlation of payoffs is stronger than the preference for earlier
resolution of uncertainty.
7. COMPARISON TO CHOICE UNDER RISK
7.1. Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
The model of Kreps and Porteus (1978) allows for a separation between the
elasticity of substitution between states and between time periods.27 However,
in that model, the difference between these two elasticities is directly related
to the strength of the preference for timing of resolution of uncertainty. In
other words, the three features—intertemporal elasticity of substitution, elas-
27This issue has also been studied, among others, by Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), Selden
(1978),a n dChew and Epstein (1990) on choice domains, which do not allow for temporal reso-
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ticity of substitution between states, and preference for timing of resolution
of uncertainty—are interdependent; roughly speaking, knowing two of them
is sufﬁcient to determine the third. For this reason, the Kreps–Porteus model
may be seen as restrictive because it does not allow enough freedom to specify
the three parameters independently.
To see this, suppose that u(x) = xα for some α ∈ (0 1).C o n s i d e rﬁ r s ta
discounted second-order expected utility model, with φ(x) = xρ for some
ρ ∈ (0 1].Thisconstitutesa(subjective)analogueoftheKreps–Porteusmodel.
In this model, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is equal to (1−α)−1,
whereas the elasticity of substitution between states is equal to (1 − αρ)−1.A s
long as these two are different, that is, as long as ρ  = 1, the decision maker will
not be indifferent toward timing of resolution of uncertainty.28
From this point of view, dynamic ambiguity models allow more ﬂexibility. In
particular, a discounted MEU model allows for a separation of the three fea-
tures. Indifference to timing is guaranteed by Theorem 1, while the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution is (1 − α)−1, which is not identically equal to
the elasticity of substitution between states. The latter varies between zero and
(1 − α)−1, depending on the act at which it is computed. This shows that it is
possible to drive a wedge between the two elasticities without forcing timing
nonindifference.
7.2. Timing Attitudes
Dynamic models of ambiguity may be seen as more ﬂexible than those of
risk for yet another reason. As Theorem 1 of Chew and Epstein (1989) shows,
when preferences are deﬁned over lotteries rather than acts, indifference to
timing implies that the certainty equivalent (the counterpart of the functional
I intheir model)hasto beexpected utility. Incontrast,Theorem1ofthis paper
shows that in the domain of acts, the class of preferences indifferent to timing
is larger: it is precisely MEU.
Even more restrictive is the fact that most of the known departures from
expected utility in the risk domain induce a nonuniform attitude toward
timing (much like the constant relative ambiguity aversion preferences of
Corollary 2(ii)). Proposition 1 of Grant, Kajii, and Polak (2000) shows that
(if preferences are rank-dependent or satisfy betweenness) expected utility is a
necessary consequence of preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty.29 In
contrast, Theorems 1–4 of this paper show that in the domain of acts, the class
28According to Theorem 1, the decision maker displays an indifference to the timing of reso-
lution of uncertainty if and only if I is MEU. The only intersection of MEU and second-order
expected utility preferences is expected utility preferences (i.e., ρ = 1).
29More precisely, Proposition 1 of Grant, Kajii, and Polak (2000) as well as Theorem 1 of
Chew and Epstein (1989) allow for the certainty equivalent in each time period to differ and
show that all but the ﬁrst or last certainty equivalents have to be EU. These results imply the
above statements in the context of a model with a constant certainty equivalent, like the one
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of such preferences is larger: it includes all variational and conﬁdence prefer-
ences, as well as certain second-order expected utility and smooth ambiguity
preferences.
An illustrative case in point is the rank-dependent utility (RDU) of Quiggin
(1982) and Yaari (1987) in which probability distributions are distorted by a
transformation function. When the preferences are deﬁned on acts, assuming
that the probability transformation function is convex, this model reduces to
Choquet expected utility with a convex capacity—a special case of MEU—and
thus satisﬁes timing indifference. On the other hand, when the preferences are
deﬁned on lotteries, the aforementioned results imply nonindifference (and
nonuniform attitude) to timing.
It should be stressed that these differences are not a consequence of the
conceptual distinction between risk and ambiguity, but rather they are caused
by the dissimilarity of the two choice domains. In particular, the deﬁnition of
early resolution (relation ) in the subjective domain is less restrictive than
in the model with objective probabilities. This is caused by the fact that in the
objective setting, earlier resolution is deﬁned through probability mixtures of
lotteries, while in the subjective setting the—less ﬂexible—eventwise mixtures
are used. For this reason, although RDU does not preserve the indifferences to
timing for all comparable pairs of temporal lotteries in the objective domain, it
does so in the subjective domain because there are fewer such -comparable
pairs.
7.3. Subjective versus Objective Uncertainty
The focus of this paper is the preference for the timing of resolution of sub-
jective uncertainty. However, in environments where both subjective uncer-
tainty and objective uncertainty (or risk) are present, it is possible for prefer-
ences to display differential attitudes to the resolution of both types of uncer-
tainty. In fact, most models studied in this paper will have this property.
The choice domain of this paper can be seen as capturing risk if the set X is
interpreted as the set of objective probability distributions on some primitive
set of prizes; however, the preferences for early resolution of risk cannot be
captured by the domain, as deﬁned, because the probability distributions rep-
resented by X are on ﬁnal outcomes instead of continuation acts. However,
under a straightforward extension of the domain, studying attitudes to both
t y p e so fr e s o l u t i o ni sp o s s i b l e . 30
On such an extended choice domain, the discounted uncertainty averse pref-
erences (as in Section 4) involve nonindifference to the timing of uncertainty
30If the time horizon is ﬁnite, as in this paper, deﬁning such a domain involves a simple ﬁnitely
recursive deﬁnition. For an inﬁnite horizon, the deﬁnition is more involved and comes at the cost
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(as long as I is not MEU—the case axiomatized by Hayashi (2005)), but in-
difference to the timing of risk. More generally, in a recursive version of the
model (as in Section 5), the preferences would exhibit different preferences for
the timing of the resolution of uncertainty.31 In such models, the preference for
the timing of the resolution of risk is captured by the aggregator W , while the
preference for the timing of the resolution of subjective uncertainty is induced
by the ambiguity aversion certainty equivalent I in addition to the direct effect
coming from the aggregator W .
In a related paper, Ergin and Sarver (2010) studied preferences for the tim-
ing of the resolution of objective risk with a different choice domain, equal to
lotteries over menus of lotteries over the ﬁnal outcomes. The preferences they
study are von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) over the outer layer of lotteries,
but the preferences over menus violate strategic rationality; following Kreps
(1979) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001), a subjective state space is
derived from preferences. Ergin and Sarver (2010) associated the preference
for later resolution of risk with there being a malevolent nature that is mini-
mizing the agent’s expected utility over some set of probabilities, a represen-
tation reminiscent of ambiguity aversion. In fact, analogous effects are present
in models with an objective state space and two layers of objective risk, like
those of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and, more recently, Seo (2009).U n -
der vNM over the outer layer of lotteries, these effects manifest themselves as
a preference for mixing acts ex post (after the realization of the state), rather
than ex ante: a phenomenon captured by the uncertainty aversion axiom of
Schmeidler (1989). In models with an objective state space, this feature arises
because mixing acts ex post provides hedging, which is desired under ambigu-
ity aversion. In the Ergin and Sarver (2010) model, this feature is present even
under objective risk, since any given single lottery in their model can be seen
as a nondegenerate act with respect to the subjective state space.
APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL RESULTS
The following theorem presents a converse to Theorem 4 for second-order
expected utility preferences.
THEOREM 7: Suppose that {t ω} is a family of discounted uncertainty averse
preferenceswhere I issecond-orderexpectedutilitywithatwicedifferentiablefunc-
tion φ.
(i) If u(X) = R and it displays a preference for earlier resolution of uncer-
tainty, then Condition 1 holds.
(ii) If u(X) = R+ and it displays a preference for earlier resolution of uncer-
tainty, then Condition 2 holds.
31A recent paper by Hayashi and Miao (2011) formulates and axiomatizes a special case of
such preferences, based on Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005).1060 T. STRZALECKI
The following theorem presents a partial converse to Theorem 4 for smooth
ambiguity preferences. The assumption under which the converse is estab-
lished implies that there are more states in S than there are measures in the
support of μ. This condition also implies the full rank condition of Klibanoff,
Marinacci, and Mukerji (2009), which yields a characterization of Bayesian up-
dating in their model.
ASSUMPTION 1: S is ﬁnite with cardinality n and the support of the measure
μ is ﬁnite with cardinality m. For j = 1     m, let each measure pj ∈ suppμ be
represented as a row vector in Rn and let M be an m × n matrix of those vectors
stacked on top of each other. The matrix M has rank m.
THEOREM 8: Suppose that {t ω} is a family of discounted uncertainty averse
preferences where I is smooth ambiguity preferences with a twice differentiable
function φ that satisﬁes Assumption 1.
(i) If u(X) = R and it displays a preference for earlier resolution of uncer-
tainty, then Condition 1 holds.
(ii) If u(X) = R+ and it displays a preference for earlier resolution of uncer-
tainty, then Condition 2 holds.
APPENDIX B: PROOFS
LEMMA 1: The family {t ω} displays a preference toward earlier resolution of
uncertainty if and only if I(βξ+k) ≥ βI(ξ)+k for all ξ ∈ B0(Σ u(X)) and all
k ∈ u(X). The family {t ω} displays indifference toward timing of resolution of
uncertainty if and only if I(βξ+k) = βI(ξ)+k for all ξ ∈ B0(Σ u(X)) and all
k ∈ u(X).
PROOF:F i x x0     x T ∈ X and f ∈ F.L e tl := β0u(xt+3) + ··· +
βT−t−3u(xT). Observe that
Vt

ω (x0     x t+1 f t+1 x t+3     x T)

= u(xt)+βI

u(xt+1)+βI

u

ft+1

ω
t+1 ·

+βl

 
Because ft+1 is Gt+1-measurable, I(u(ft+1(ωt+1 ·))) = u(ft+1(ω)) = u(f(st+1))
for all ω ∈ Ω; thus by denoting ζ := u(f),
Vt

ω (x0     x t+1 f t+1 x t+3     x T)

(8)
= u(xt)+βI

u(xt+1)+β(ζ +βl)

 
On the other hand,
Vt

ω (x0     x t+1 f t+2 x t+3     x T)

= u(xt)+βI

u(xt+1)+βI

u

ft+2

ω
t+1 ·

+βl

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Because ft+2 does not depend on ωt+1, I(u(ft+2(ωt+1 ·))) = I(u(f)).T h u s ,
Vt

ω (x0     x t+1 f t+2 x t+3     x T)

(9)
= u(xt)+β

u(xt+1)+βI(ζ +βl)

 
Suppose I displays a preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty. Then
expression (8) is larger than (9)f o ra n yc h o i c eo fx0     x T ∈ X and ζ ∈ B0(Σ),
in particular, such that u(xt+1) = k and ζ = ξ+βl. The converse and the proof
of the statement about indifference follow similarly. Q.E.D.
LEMMA 2: Deﬁne B := β+β2 +···+βT. The family {t ω} displays aversion
tolong-runriskif andonly if I(ξ+BI(ξ)) ≥ I((1+B)ξ)forall ξ ∈ B0(Σ u(X)).
The family {t ω} displays indifference toward long-run risk if and only if I(ξ+
BI(ξ)) = I((1+B)ξ) for all ξ ∈ B0(Σ u(X)).
PROOF: By Deﬁnition 7, {t ω}(t ω)∈T ×Ω exhibits aversion to long-run risk if
and only if for all measurable f :S → X,
V

h
SR
f

≥ V

h
LR
f

  (10)
Fix ξ := u(f) and observe that V( h
SR
f ) = V(ˇ f0  ˇ f1      ˇ fT) = I(ξ+ BI(ξ)),
while V( h LR
f ) = V(ˇ f0  ˇ f0      ˇ f0) = I((1+B)ξ). Thus, (10)h o l d si fa n do n l yi f
I(ξ+BI(ξ)) ≥ I((1+B)ξ) for all ξ ∈ B0(Σ u(X)).
The analogous proof holds with equality for indifference. Q.E.D.
LEMMA 3: Let Φ := φ(u(X)) and, for each k ∈ u(X), deﬁne Fk:Φ → R
by Fk(γ) = φ(βφ−1(γ) + k). Suppose that φ is twice differentiable. Then Fk is
convex for each k ∈ u(X) if and only if β[−
φ  (βa+k)
φ (βa+k)]≤[ −
φ  (a)
φ (a)] for all a k ∈
u(X).
PROOF: Because φ is twice differentiable, φ−1 is twice differentiable. Con-
vexity of Fk for each k ∈ u(X) is equivalent to
F
  
k(γ) ≥ 0f o r a l l k ∈ u(X) and γ ∈ Φ  (11)
A direct computation reveals that
F
  
k(γ) = φ
  
βφ
−1(γ)+k


β
φ (φ−1(γ))
	2
−φ
 
βφ
−1(γ)+k
βφ  (φ−1(γ))
[φ (φ−1(γ))]3 
Thus, F  
k(γ) ≥ 0i fa n do n l yi fβ[−
φ  (βφ−1(γ)+k)
φ (βφ−1(γ)+k)]≤[ −
φ  (φ−1(γ))
φ (φ−1(γ))]. Q.E.D.1062 T. STRZALECKI
LEMMA 4: Letu(X) = R and Φ := φ(R),andforeach k ∈ R,deﬁne Fk:Φ →
R by Fk(γ) = φ(βφ−1(γ)+k). Suppose that φ is twice differentiable. Then Fk is
convex for each k ∈ R if and only if there exists A ≥ 0 such that −
φ  (a)
φ (a) ∈[ βA A]
for all a ∈ R.
PROOF:L e ta b ∈ R.D e ﬁ n ek := b − βa. By Lemma 3, convexity of Fk is
equivalent to
β

−
φ  (b)
φ (b)
	
≤

−
φ  (a)
φ (a)
	
for all a b ∈ R  (12)
It is immediate that condition (12) is implied if there exists A ≥ 0 such that
−
φ  (a)
φ (a) ∈[ βA A] for all a ∈ R.C o n v e r s e l y ,l e tA := supb∈R[−
φ  (b)
φ (b)]. The num-
ber A is ﬁnite, because otherwise condition (12) is violated by ﬁxing a and
letting the left hand side diverge. Let A  := infa∈R[−
φ  (a)
φ (a)].I fA  <β A , then
ﬁnd two real numbers such that A  <l   <l<β A .T h e r ee x i s ta b ∈ R with
[−
φ  (a)
φ (a)] <l   and lβ−1 < [−
φ  (b)
φ (b)].T h u s ,[−
φ  (a)
φ (a)] <l   <l<β [−
φ  (b)
φ (b)]. Contra-
diction. Q.E.D.
LEMMA 5: Suppose K ∈{ R+ R} and I :B0(Σ K) → R is concave and nor-
malized, and there exists α ∈ (0 1) such that I(αξ) = αI(ξ) for all ξ ∈ B0(Σ K).
Then I is positively homogeneous.
PROOF: By concavity and normalization, it follows that I(bξ)= I(bξ+(1−
b)0) ≥ bI(ξ)+(1−b)I(0) = bI(ξ) for all ξ ∈ B0(Σ K) and all b ∈ (0 1).
Suppose, toward contradiction, that there exist a ∈ (0 1) and ξ ∈ B0(Σ K)
such that I(aξ) > aI(ξ). Observe that I(αnξ) = I(ααn−1ξ) = αI(αn−1ξ) =
···=αnI(ξ) for any n ∈ N. Choose n such that αn <a . For this n, it follows
that αnI(ξ)= I(αnξ)= I(
αn
a aξ +
a−αn
a 0) ≥
αn
a I(aξ)>αnI(ξ). Contradiction.
Homogeneity for a>1 follows trivially. Q.E.D.
B.1. Proof of Theorem 1
By taking k = 0 in Lemma 1, the indifference to timing of uncertainty im-
plies that I(βξ)= βI(ξ) for any ξ ∈ B0(Σ u(X)). It follows that I(βξ+k) =
βI(ξ) + k = I(βξ)+ k for any ξ ∈ B0(Σ u(X)) and k ∈ u(X), which means
that
I(ζ+k) = I(ζ)+k for any ζ ∈ B0

Σ u(X)

and k ∈ u(X)  (13)
If u(X) = R,then I satisﬁesthedeﬁnitionofverticalinvarianceofMaccheroni,
Marinacci, and Rustichini (2004, Deﬁnition (iii), p. 18).
Suppose that u(X) = R+ and that ζ ∈ B0(Σ u(X)) and ζ +k ∈ B0(Σ u(X))
for some k ∈ R; it follows that k ≥−infζ.I fk<0, then I(ζ)= I((ζ + k) −MODELS OF AMBIGUITY AVERSION 1063
k) = I(ζ+ k) − k, where the second equality follows from (13). Thus, I(ζ)+
k = I(ζ + k) for all 0 >k≥−infζ. This equality follows directly from (13)
for k ≥ 0; thus I satisﬁes the deﬁnition of vertical invariance of Maccheroni,
Marinacci, and Rustichini (2004, Deﬁnition (iii), p. 18).
Hence, I is vertically invariant on B0(Σ u(X)) in both cases u(X) = R and
u(X) = R+. By Lemma 23 of Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2004),
I is a niveloid and hence is continuous. By Lemma 20 of Maccheroni, Mari-
nacci, and Rustichini (2004), quasiconcavity of I implies its concavity. By
Lemma 5 of this paper, I is positively homogeneous. Thus it satisﬁes the as-
sumptions of Lemma 3.5 of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989); therefore, there
exists a closed and convex set C ⊆ Δ(S) such that I(ξ)= minp∈C

ξdp for all
ξ:S → R. Q.E.D.
B.2. Proof of Theorem 2
By Lemma 1, the preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty is equiv-
alent to I(βξ + k) ≥ βI(ξ) + k for all ξ ∈ B0(Σ u(X)) and k ∈ u(X).B y
concavity of I, I(βξ+ k) = I(βξ+ (1 − β)
k
1−β) ≥ βI(ξ) + (1 − β)I(
k
1−β) =
βI(ξ)+k. Q.E.D.
B.3. Proof of Corollary 1
The proof of Corollary 1 follows from Theorem 2, since the functional I for
variational preferences is concave. Q.E.D.
B.4. Proof of Theorem 3
By Lemma 25 of Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006a), it sufﬁces
to show that
I(ξ)−I(ζ)≤ sup(ξ −ζ) for all ξ ζ ∈ B0(Σ) 
Fix ξ ∈ B0(Σ) and k ∈ R and let b ∈ (0 1). By concavity, I(bξ+ k) = I(bξ+
(1−b)
k
1−b) ≥ bI(ξ)+(1−b)I(
k
1−b) and, by normalization, (1−b)I(
k
1−b) = k.
Thus,
I(bξ+k) ≥ bI(ξ)+k for all ξ ∈ B0(Σ) k ∈ R and b ∈ (0 1)  (14)
Observe that  bξ + k − ξ − k =  (1 − b)ξ =(1 − b) ξ ; therefore,
limb→1(bξ +k) = ξ +k. Thus, by (14) and by continuity of I,
I(ξ+k) ≥ I(ξ)+k for all ξ ∈ B0(Σ) and k ∈ R  (15)
Observe that for all ξ ∈ B0(Σ) and k ∈ R,
I(ξ+k) ≥ I(ξ)+k = I

(ξ +k)−k

+k (16)
≥ I(ξ+k)−k+k = I(ξ+k) 1064 T. STRZALECKI
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from (15) applied to ξ and k, and the second
inequality follows from (15) applied to ξ +k and −k. Thus, (16) implies that
I(ξ+k) = I(ξ)+k for all ξ ∈ B0(Σ) and k ∈ R  (17)
Note that ξ −sup(ξ −ζ)= ξ +inf(ζ −ξ)≤ ζ; thus
I(ξ)−sup(ξ −ζ)= I

ξ −sup(ξ −ζ)

≤ I(ζ)  (18)
where the equality follows from (16) applied to ξ and −sup(ξ − ζ), and the
inequality is a consequence of monotonicity of I. Rearranging (18) delivers the
conclusion. Q.E.D.
B.5. Proof of Corollary 2
(i) Part (i) follows from Theorem 2, since the functional I for conﬁdence
preferences is concave.
(ii) Constant relative ambiguity aversion means that I(βξ)= βI(ξ) for all
ξ ∈ B0(Σ). By Lemma 1, I(βξ+ k) ≥ βI(ξ) + k for all ξ ∈ B0(Σ) and k ∈ R.
Thus I(βξ+ k) ≥ βI(ξ) + k = I(βξ)+ k for all ξ ∈ B0(Σ) and k ∈ R,w h i c h
means that
I(ζ+k) ≥ I(ζ)+k for all ζ ∈ B0(Σ) and k ∈ R  (19)
Suppose, anticipating a contradiction, that I(ζ + k) > I(ζ) + k for some
ζ ∈ B0(Σ) and k ∈ R.T h e nI(ζ+k) > I(ζ)+k = I((ζ +k)−k)+k ≥ I(ζ+
k)−k+k = I(ζ+k), where the last inequality follows from (19). Contradic-
tion. Thus I satisﬁes the assumptions of Lemma 3.5 of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), so there exists a closed, convex set C ⊆ Δ(S) with I(ξ)= minp∈C

ξdp
for all ξ:S → R. Q.E.D.
B.6. Proof of the SOEU Case of Theorems 4 and 7
Let Φ := φ(u(X)). Preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty is equiv-
alent to

φ(βξ+k)dp ≥ φ

βφ
−1

φ(ξ)dp

+k

(20)
for all ξ ∈ B0

Σ u(X)

and k ∈ u(X) 
For each k ∈ u(X),d e ﬁ n eFk:Φ → R by Fk(γ) = φ(βφ−1(γ) + k).W i t h
this notation, (20) becomes

Fk(φ(ξ))dp ≥ Fk(

φ(ξ)dp) for all ξ ∈ B0(Σ 
u(X)) and k ∈ u(X). By letting ζ = φ(ξ),t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o

Fk(ζ)dp ≥ Fk

ζ dp

for all ζ ∈ B0(Σ Φ) and k ∈ u(X)  (21)MODELS OF AMBIGUITY AVERSION 1065
Next, condition (21) is equivalent to convexity of Fk for all k ∈ u(X).T os e e
that, observe that sufﬁciency follows from Jensen’s inequality. Conversely, sup-
pose that (21) holds and ﬁnd an event E ∈ Σ such that 0 <p ( E)<1, denoting
α := p(E).F o ra n yγ γ  ∈ Φ, condition (21) applied to ζ = γEγ  implies that
αFk(γ) + (1 − α)Fk(γ ) ≥ Fk(αγ + (1 − α)γ ) for each k ∈ u(X).B yT h e o -
rem 88 of Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya (1952), for each k ∈ u(X),f u n c t i o nFk
is convex (for any k, the function Fk is continuous). An application of Lemmas
3 and 4 leads to the desired conclusions. Q.E.D.
B.7. Proof of the Klibanoff–Marinacci–Mukerji Case of Theorems 4 and 8
LetΦ := φ(R).ByLemma 1,preferenceforearlierresolutionofuncertainty
is equivalent to

Δ(Σ)
φ

β

ξdp+k

dμ(p)
≥ φ

βφ
−1

Δ(Σ)
φ

ξdp

dμ(p)

+k

for all ξ ∈ B0

Σ u(X)

and k ∈ u(X) 
For each k ∈ u(X),d e ﬁ n eFk:Φ → R by Fk(γ) = φ(βφ−1(γ) + k). With this
notation, this condition becomes

Δ(Σ)
Fk

φ

ξdp

dμ(p) ≥ Fk

Δ(Σ)
φ

ξdp

dμ(p)

for all ξ ∈ B0

Σ u(X)

and k ∈ u(X) 
By deﬁning Υ := {χ:Δ(Σ) → R | χ(p) = φ(

ξdp) for some ξ ∈ B0(Σ 
u(X))}, this condition can be rewritten as

Δ(Σ)
Fk(χ)dμ ≥ Fk

Δ(Σ)
χdμ

for all χ ∈ Υ and k ∈ u(X) 
Sufﬁciency follows from Lemmas 3 and 4 and Jensen’s inequality. For neces-
sity, observe that under Assumption 1, the above condition is equivalent to
m 

j=1
Fk(χj)μj ≥ Fk

m 

j=1
χjμj

for all χ ∈ Υ and k ∈ u(X) 
where Υ ={ χ ∈ Rm | χj = φ((Mξ)j) for some ξ ∈ (u(X))n}={ χ ∈ Rm | χj =
φ(ζj) for some ζ ∈ (u(X))m}.T a k i n gζ = (a b     b) for all a b ∈ u(X)
ensures that for all c d ∈ Φ, the set Υ includes all vectors of the form1066 T. STRZALECKI
(c d     d). Hence, the preference for earlier resolution of uncertainty im-
plies that
Fk(c)μ1 +Fk(d)(1−μ1) ≥ Fk

cμ1 +d(1−μ1)

for all c d ∈ Φ 
By Theorem 88 of Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya (1952), for each k ∈ u(X),
function Fk is convex (for any k the function Fk is continuous). An application
of Lemmas 3 and 4 leads to the desired conclusions. Q.E.D.
B.8. Proof of Theorem 6
Deﬁne B := β+β2 +···+βT.F i xξ ∈ B0(Σ u(X)) and deﬁne α ∈ (0 1) by
α :=
1
1+B. By normalization and concavity of I,
I(ξ)= I

α(1+B)ξ+(1−α)0

≥ αI

(1+B)ξ

+(1−α)I(0) = αI

(1+B)ξ

 
so
0 ≤ ε := (1+B)I(ξ)−I

(1+B)ξ

  (22)
To prove the aversion to long-run risk, note that by the argument that leads to
expression (11) in the proof of Theorem 3 (with k = BI(ξ)), we have
I

ξ +BI(ξ)

≥ I(ξ)+BI(ξ) 
Thus, by (22),
I(ξ+Bξ)≤ I

ξ +BI(ξ)

 
which, by Lemma 2, proves the aversion to long-run risk.
To prove the second part of the theorem, note that by Lemma 2, indifference
toward long-run risk implies that for any ξ ∈ B0(Σ u(X)),
I

ξ +BI(ξ)

= I

(1+B)ξ

  (23)
Claim 1. I is positively homogeneous. To see that, note that
ξ +BI(ξ) = α[ξ +Bξ]+(1−α)

I(ξ)+BI(ξ)

 
Let
B0

Σ u(X)

  ψ := α[ξ +Bξ]+(1−α)I(ξ +Bξ) (24)
and note that
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Note that by quasiconcavity and normalization of I and by (24), we have
I(ψ) ≥ I(ξ + Bξ).I fε>0, then strict monotonicity implies that I(ξ +
BI(ξ)) > I(ψ). Thus, for any ξ ∈ B0(Σ u(X)),w eh a v e(1 + B)I(ξ) = I((1 +
B)ξ), which implies positive homogeneity by setting ζ :=
1
αξ and applying
Lemma 5. This concludes the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 2.F o ra n yξ and any γ ∈[ 0 1],
I

γx+(1−γ)y

= I

(1+B)ξ

 
where x := (1+B)ξ and y := I((1+B)ξ). To prove the claim, observe that, by
positive homogeneity,
ξ +BI(ξ) = αx+(1−α)y 
From the normalization assumption, I(x)= I(y), so by indifference to long-
run risk and Lemma 2,
I

αx+(1−α)y

= I

ξ +BI(ξ)

= I

(1+B)ξ

 
Deﬁne f :[ 0 1]→R by f(γ):= I(γx+ (1 − γ)y)− I((1 + B)ξ) and observe
that f(0) = f(1) = f(α) = 0 for some 0 <α<1. Observe that f is a concave
and nonnegative function as a consequence of the concavity of I. Suppose that
there exists γ ∈ (0 1) with f(γ)>0. If γ>α , then α = δγ + (1 − δ)0f o r
δ = αγ−1.B yc o n c a v i t y ,0= f(α) ≥ δf(γ) + (1 − δ)f(0)>0, contradiction. If
γ<α , then α = δγ + (1 − δ)1f o rδ = (1 − α)(1 − γ)−1.B yc o n c a v i t y ,0=
f(α) ≥ δf(γ) + (1 − δ)f(1)>0, contradiction. This concludes the proof of
Claim 2.
Claim 3. I(ξ+ k) = I(ξ)+ k for all ξ k such that I(ξ)≥ 0a n dk>0. To
prove the claim, ﬁrst assume that I(ξ)>0 and let γ be deﬁned by
1−γ
γ
=
k
I(ξ)
and deﬁne
ζ :=
1
γ(1+B)
ξ 
Then
ξ +k = γ(1+B)ζ +(1−γ)I

(1+B)ζ

 
so by the above claim, it follows that
I(ξ+k) = I

(1+B)ζ

= I

(1+B)
1
γ(1+B)
ξ

=
1
γ
I(ξ)
= I(ξ)+

1
γ
−1

I(ξ)= I(ξ)+k 1068 T. STRZALECKI
By continuity, the above equality implies that I(ξ+ k) = I(ξ)+ k for all ξ k
such that I(ξ)= 0a n dk>0, which concludes the proof of Claim 3.
Claim 4. I(ξ+ k) = I(ξ)+ k for all ξ k such that I(ξ)≤ 0a n dk<0. The
proof is analogous.
Claim 5. I(ξ+k) = I(ξ)+k for all ξ k. To prove the claim, ﬁx ξ with I(ξ)≥
0 and suppose that k<0. (The case when I(ξ)≤ 0a n dk>0 is analogous.)
First, if I(ξ+ k) ≥ 0, then let ζ := ξ + k and note that Claim 3 implies that
I(ζ + (−k)) = I(ζ)+ (−k), which is the desired conclusion. Suppose now
that I(ξ+ k) < 0. By continuity, there exists l ∈ R such that I(ξ+ l) = 0. Let
ζ := ξ + l and note that by Claim 3 we have that l =− I(ξ).N o w ,b yC l a i m4 ,
I(ξ+k) = I(ζ+(k−l))= I(ζ)+(k−l)= 0+k+I(ξ), which concludes the
proof of Claim 5.
To conclude the proof, note that Claim 5 implies that I is vertically invari-
ant. Thus I satisﬁes the assumptions of Lemma 3.5 of Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1989); therefore, there exists a closed and convex set C ⊆ Δ(S) such that
I(ξ)= minp∈C

ξdp for all ξ:S → R. Q.E.D.
B.9. Proof of Corollary 3
(i) Deﬁne B := β+β2+···+βT.F i xξ ∈ B0(Σ u(X)) and deﬁne α ∈ (0 1)
by α :=
1
1+B. Since variational preferences are concave, Theorem 6 proves the
aversion to long-run risk.
(ii) Deﬁne B := β + β2 +···+βT.F i xξ ∈ B0(Σ u(X)) and deﬁne α ∈
(0 1) by α :=
1
1+B.S i n c ef o ru(x) = R+, conﬁdence preferences are concave,
Theorem 6 proves the aversion to long-run risk.
(iii) Case (iii) follows from cases (i) and (ii) and the fact that a smooth am-
biguity preference with concave φ CARA or CRRA is a variational preference
or a conﬁdence preference respectively. Q.E.D.
B.10. Proof of Theorem 5
Sufﬁciency is trivial. For necessity, assume that  Vt is the representation of
{t ω} in terms of (W disc I u) and let  Vt be its representation in terms of
(W IMEU v).
Step 1—v = φ ◦ u.F i xx0 x 1     x T−1 ∈ X and let h range over (x0 x 1     
xT−1 x) for x ∈ X.T h e n VT(ω h) = u(x),w h i l e VT(ω h) = v(x). Because
 VT and  VT represent the same order T ω, they have to be ordinally equiv-
alent; thus, there exists a strictly increasing function φ:R → R such that
v(x)= φ(u(x)) for all x ∈ X.
Step 2—I(ξ) := φ−1(minp∈C

φ(ξ)dp).F i xx0 x 1     x T−1 ∈ X and let
h range over (x0 x 1     x T−1  ˇ fT) for f ∈ F. Observe that  VT−1(ω h) =
u(xT−1)+βI(u(f)),w h i l e
 VT−1(ω h) = W

xT−1 I
MEU
v(f)

= W

xT−1 min
p∈C

φ

u(f)

dp

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Because  VT−1 and  VT−1 represent the same order, T−1 ω,t h e yh a v et ob eo r -
dinally equivalent; in particular, their restrictions to F have to be ordinally
equivalent. Of course, the restriction of  VT−1 is ordinally equivalent to I(u(f))
andtherestrictionof  VT−1 isordinallyequivalentto φ−1(minp∈C

φ(u(f))dp).
Observe that they coincide on constant acts; for this reason, it is possible to de-
ﬁne induced preferences over “utility acts” B0(Σ). The representation of this
preference induced by  VT−1 is simply I, while the representation induced by
 VT−1 is J(ξ):= φ−1(minp∈C

φ(ξ)dp). They are both ordinally equivalent, so
there exists a strictly increasing function ψ:R → R such that I(ξ)= ψ(J(ξ))
for all ξ ∈ B0(Σ). In particular, this must hold for all constant utility acts:
I(r)= ψ(J(r)) for all r ∈ R. However, I is normalized by assumption, whereas
J is normalized by direct veriﬁcation. Thus, for all r ∈ R, it must be that
r = I(r)= ψ(J(r)) = ψ(r); hence, ψ is identity and I is equal to J.
Step 3—φ is continuous and concave. Recall that there exists an essential
event E ∈ Σ.L e tα := minp∈C p(E) and note that 0 <α<1. The mapping I
induces a mapping on the set {(k k) ∈ R2 | k ≥ k} by considering utility acts
of the form kEk. This induced mapping is (k k)  → αφ(k) + (1 − α)φ(k);
observe that it inherits quasiconcavity. To show the concavity of φ,f o ra n yk ∈
R,considertherestrictionofthequasiconcavemapping (k k)  → αφ(k)+(1−
α)φ(k) to the set (−∞ k)×(k ∞).B yT h e o r e m1o fDebreu and Koopmans
(1982), the function φ is continuous on (k ∞); hence it is continuous on R
in light of the arbitrary choice of k. By the proposition of Yaari (1977), φ is a
concave function on (k ∞); hence it is concave on R in light of the arbitrary
choice of k.
Step 4—W( x  d)= ϕ(u(x) + βφ−1(d)). Recall that  VT−1 and  VT−1 are ordi-
nally equivalent on X × F. For this reason, there exists a strictly increasing
function ϕ:R → R such that
W

xT−1 min
p∈C

φ

u(f)

dp

= ϕ

u(xT−1)+βI

u(f)

for all xT−1 ∈ X and all f ∈ F. Because I is equal to J, it follows that
W( x T−1 φ(I(u(f)))) = ϕ(u(xT−1)+βI(u(f))) for all xT−1 ∈ X and all f ∈F.
This means that W( x  φ( γ) )= ϕ(u(x) + βγ) for all x ∈ X and all γ ∈ R.
Hence, W( x  d)= ϕ(u(x)+βφ−1(d)) for all x ∈ X and all d ∈ Range(φ).
Step 5—ϕ(r) = aφ(r) + b.F i xx0 x 1     x T−2 ∈ X and xT ∈ X such that
u(xT) = 0; let h range over (x0 x 1     x T−2  ˇ fT−1 x T) for f ∈ F. Observe that
 VT−2(ω h) = u(xT−2)+βI
 VT−1

ω
T−1 ·

 h

= u(xT−2)+βI

u(f)

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Thus,  VT−2 induces a quasiconcave order on B0(Σ) represented by ξ  →
minp∈C

φ(ξ)dp. On the other hand,
 VT−2(ω h) = W

xT−2 I
MEU VT−1

ω
T−1 ·

 h

= ϕ

u(xT−2)+βφ
−1
I
MEU VT−1

ω
T−1 ·

 h

= ϕ

u(xT−2)+βφ
−1
I
MEU
ϕ

u(f)

 
Thus,  VT−2 induces an order on B0(Σ) represented by ξ  → minp∈C

ϕ(ξ)dp.
Because  VT−2 and  VT−2 are ordinally equivalent, the mappings ξ  →
minp∈C

φ(ξ)dp and ξ  → minp∈C

ϕ(ξ)dp represent the same quasiconcave
order on B0(Σ). Both mappings induce mappings on the set {(k k) ∈ R2 | k ≥
k} by considering utility acts of the form kEk. These induced mappings are
(k k)  → αφ(k) + (1 − α)φ(k) and (k k)  → αϕ(k) + (1 − α)ϕ(k);o b s e r v e
that they inherit quasiconcavity. Standard arguments from expected utility the-
ory (see, e.g., Theorem 83 of Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya (1952)) imply that
there exist a>0 b∈ R such that ϕ(r) = aφ(r)+b for all r ∈ R.
Step 6—aφ(r)+b = φ(r+c).F i xx0 x 1     x T−3 ∈ X and xT ∈ X such that
u(xT) = 0; let h range over (x0 x 1     x T) for xT−1 x T−2 ∈ X. Observe that
 VT−2(ω h) = u(xT−2)+βu(xT−1)
and
 VT−2(ω h) = aφ

u(xT−2)+βφ
−1
aφ

u(xT−1)

+b

+b 
They both induce an order on X ×X that has two additive representations:
(x y)  → u(x)+βu(y)
and
(x y)  → u(x)+βφ
−1
aφ

u(y)

+b 
By the uniqueness of additively separable representations, since the ﬁrst
component utility is identical in both representations, this implies that
φ−1(aφ(u(y)) + b) = u(y) + c,s oaφ(u(y)) + b = φ(u(y)+ c). This implies
that aφ(r)+b = φ(r +c) for all r ∈ R.
Step 7—ϕ = φ or φ(r) = dar/c +
b
1−a.S i n c eφ is continuous and concave,
χ := φ−1 is a convex function. Thus, both φ and χ have at most countably
many points of nondifferentiability. Focus attention on the complement of this
set. If a = 1a n dc  = 0, then φ (r) = φ (r + c), which implies that φ is afﬁne
and this concludes the proof, since IMEU is invariant to afﬁne transformations.
If a = 1a n dc = 0, then b = 0 and this concludes the proof. Suppose a  = 1. IfMODELS OF AMBIGUITY AVERSION 1071
c = 0, then (1 − a)φ(r) = b, which is a contradiction, since φ is nonconstant.
Thus, a  = 1a n dc  = 0. In this case then, the most general solution to aφ(r) +
b = φ(r + c) is φ(r)= dar/c +
b
1−a; see, for example, Polyanin and Manzhirov
(2008). Q.E.D.
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